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Abstract—WebAssembly (wasm) has recently emerged as a
promisingly portable, size-efficient, fast, and safe binary format
for the web. As WebAssembly can interact freely with JavaScript
libraries, this gives rise to a potential for undesirable behavior
to occur. It is therefore important to be able to detect when this
might happen. A way to do this is through taint tracking, where
we follow the flow of information by applying taint labels to
data. In this paper, we describe TaintAssembly, a taint tracking
engine for interpreted WebAssembly, that we have created by
modifying the V8 JavaScript engine. We implement basic taint
tracking functionality, taint in linear memory, and a probabilistic
variant of taint. We then benchmark our TaintAssembly engine by
incorporating it into a Chromium build and running it on custom
test scripts and various real world WebAssembly applications.
We find that our modifications to the V8 engine do not incur
significant overhead with respect to vanilla V8’s interpreted
WebAssembly, making TaintAssembly suitable for development
and debugging.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a trend toward more demanding applica-
tions on the web. This necessitates a delivery format that is
portable across platforms, compact in size, fast to execute,
and comparatively safe to use. JavaScript is too slow for most
complex applications, and it is inconvenient as a compilation
target. Various solutions have been proposed for this problem,
including asm.js, which has gained reasonable popularity as
of late [1]. The newest, cross-browser solution is WebAssem-
bly (wasm) [2]. Although it is executed in a partially restricted
environment, wasm can interact freely with JavaScript libraries
and functions [3], providing a vector for wasm to interact
with other areas of the users’ computer in unpredictable and
potentially undesirable ways.
With this in mind, it would be nice for developers to be able
to detect possible vulnerabilities and unexpected behavior in
their wasm programs. In particular, it would be useful to track
data flows between wasm programs and JavaScript, as that is
the primary way in which wasm is exposed. This motivates
dynamic taint tracking, in which we mark and follow the flow
of information through a system.
As far as we know, no tools currently exist for performing
such analysis on wasm. Given wasm’s current early stage
of development, it would be helpful for such a utility to be
developed before wasm becomes ubiquitous. We therefore pro-
pose TaintAssembly, a modified version of the V8 JavaScript
engine that implements dynamic taint tracking for interpreted
WebAssembly.
We begin with describing relevant background and previous
research on WebAssembly and taint tracking in Section 2. We
follow this with a description of the TaintAssembly engine
that we implemented in Section 3. Section 4 describes various
testing and benchmarking that we performed on our engine,
Section 5 described some limitations to our approach, Section
6 denotes some difficulties faced, and Section 7 contains some
concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. WebAssembly (wasm)
WebAssembly is a new portable, size- and load-time effi-
cient format, suitable for compilation to the web. WebAssem-
bly is not intended to be a standalone programming language,
but rather is primarily designed to act as a compile target for
C/C++ code (or JavaScript [4]). The wasm specifications [3]
lay out the primitives and structures that must be available,
and all of the major browsers have implemented some way of
executing wasm code. WebAssembly has a “linear memory,”
which is analogous to the heap in C/C++. WebAssembly does
not enforce memory safety within its memory. However, this
memory is kept isolated from everything else, including the
code space, execution space, and the executing engine’s code
and data. WebAssembly also has a standard interpreter, used
for testing production code and prototyping new code [2].
Chromium’s V8 JavaScript engine is able to execute wasm,
and will be the primary engine considered in this paper. V8
uses two different methods to process wasm bytecode.
1) Interpreted Method: This is primarily used for debug-
ging and testing, and executes the wasm bytecode line
by line at runtime [2].
2) Compiled Method: This compiles a wasm file to na-
tive bytecode before execution, mitigating the warm-
up time that slows down JavaScript [2]. This means
that at execution time, the wasm code runs extremely
quickly. This is the default way in which most real-
world wasm is handled.
Although V8 compiles most WebAssembly applications
to native bytecode, implementing taint tracking for native
bytecode is difficult as it would require targeting a user’s native
architecture (mips, arm, x86, etc.). As this varies from user
to user, this would greatly increase the complexity of taint
tracking. We foresee our tool as something used primarily by
researchers and developers, and not in a production environ-
ment, so we will focus solely on interpreted wasm.
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B. Taint Tracking
Taint tracking is a method for following specific data
throughout the execution of a program. Each item that you
want to track, be it a primitive or object, is assigned an
additional variable that will store its taint value. Each bit of
the taint value corresponds to a different source of data, such
as network packets, user input, or other information that might
be considered important. When these data sources are used in
calculations, or interact with each other, a taint tracking engine
updates the taint values accordingly, allowing a developer to
observe how information has interacted.
Taint tracking has been implemented previously for a num-
ber of different goals and applications. It can be used to detect
vulnerabilities in binaries and assist in the analysis of malware
and network protocols, as well as actively guard against attacks
in runtime [5]. It has been implemented on a variety of
systems, ranging from TaintDroid [6], which modified the
Dalvik interpreter to perform taint tracking for Java bytecode
on Android, to static and dynamic taint analysis implemented
for JavaScript bytecode in Safari’s Webkit Javascript engine
[7].
Taint tracking has also been implemented at a lower level.
Panorama [8] implements taint tracking at the instruction level
for a whole system with fine granularity using QEMU. They
use shadow memory, to store taints for every byte of memory,
all registers and the network buffer. They also implement
conditional taint propagation for certain functions, notably
those taking keyboard input.
A lot of work has been done to speed up taint tracking for
both debugging and production use. Some approaches to taint
tracking use heuristics to determine the granularity of dynamic
taint tracking. For example, the CloudTaint system [9] uses
certain triggers from data sources to decide whether or not to
activate taint tracking at the instruction level. This prevents the
CloudTaint system from constantly using up processing power
needed for other VMs in the group.
Unfortunately, static taint analysis suffers somewhat from
a lack of precision while dynamic taint tracking has a high
performance overhead [10]. Therefore, most recent work into
taint tracking has taken a combined approach.
One such ensemble approach is to pre-process taint track-
ing for specific functions, establishing function summaries.
Zhu et. al. [11] use the pre-computed function summaries along
with semantic analysis [12] [13] to speed up taint tracking by
an order of magnitude. Through static analysis, some functions
can be determined to not propagate taints from certain inputs to
outputs. Instead of running through the entire function with full
taint propagation, only a patch function is needed to propagate
taint from the inputs to the outputs, eliminating most of the
overhead and context switching associated with propagating
taint. While most of the previous work has dealt with compiled
binaries, the idea of using function summaries to speed up
dynamic taint propagation is still applicable to wasm binaries.
Another approach that has worked well is not optimiza-
tion through static analysis of binaries or code, but rather
a dynamic optimization of taint propagation itself. Bruening
et al. [14] constructed a dynamic optimization system that
optimizes linear sequences of code with changing levels of
details to describe instructions. Although Bruening’s work
did not directly involve taint propagation, similar ideas can
be applied to dynamic taint tracking as well. Saxena et al.
[15] demonstrated a method of storing a metadata stack and
implemented metadata caching in registers, which allowed for
quick retrieval of small metadata such as taint during runtime.
In our TaintAssembly engine, our basic taint tracking is
modeled off of TaintDroid [6], while our taint tracking on the
wasm linear memory draws from the idea of shadow memory
presented in Panorama [8]. The other work presents interesting
ideas for optimizing and improving dynamic taint tracking, but
are significantly trickier to implement in the WebAssembly
interpreter, so for the sake of time and simplicity we do not
implement these in our TaintAssembly engine.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented taint tracking for WebAssembly by mod-
ifying the V8 JavaScript Engine, used in Google Chrome,
Chromium, and Node.js [16]. A GitHub repository containing
our modifications, as well as some testing scripts, can be found
at https://github.com/wfus/WebAssembly-Taint.
A. Basic Taint Tracking
Our first modification was implementing basic taint track-
ing. For interpreted WebAssembly, V8 wraps the WebAssem-
bly standard values i32, i64, f32, f64 using a WasmValue
class. Therefore, for caching purposes, we introduced taint
labels as part of each WasmValue object, similar to Taint-
Droid’s modification to Dalvik [6]. Our structure is exhibited
in Figure 1. Note that while we allow the user to set the size
of taint_t, our default is 4 bytes, which is what we have
exhibited in the diagram, and what we will assume for the rest
of this paper.
Fig. 1. The structure of a WasmValue with taint appended.
In order to initialize the taints, we implemented signature
overloading, so a user simply needs to add extra parameters
describing taint values to their function calls. For example,
if we have a sample JavaScript function invoking a wasm
function
myfunction = exports._wasm_function
with three integer parameters A, B, C, we could have function
calls
myfunction(50, 100, 200);
myfunction(50,100, 200, 0x000000f0);
myfunction(1, 2, 3, 0x1, 0x2, 0x4, 0x8);
where in the first line, all parameters have no taint, in the
second the first parameter has taint 0x000000f0, and in
2
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Wasm Opcode Operation Taint Propagation Description
0x45 - 0x4f i32.binop v1 v2 (comparison) T (R) = 0 Comparison ops do not propagate taint.
0x50 - 0x5a i64.binop v1 v2 (comparison) T (R) = 0 Comparison ops do not propagate taint.
0x5b - 0x60 f32.binop v1 v2 (comparison) T (R) = 0 Comparison ops do not propagate taint.
0x61 - 0x66 f64.binop v1 v2 (comparison) T (R) = 0 Comparison ops do not propagate taint.
0x67 - 0x69 i32.unop v1 T (R) = T (v1) Unops should receive taint of the parameter.
0x70 - 0x78 i32.binop v1 v2 (non-comparison) T (R) = T (v1) ∨ T (v2) Non-comparison binops should receive taint of both parameters.
0x79 - 0x7b i64.unop v1 T (R) = T (v1) Unops should receive taint of the parameter.
0x7c - 0x8a i64.binop v1 v2 (non-comparison) T (R) = T (v1) ∨ T (v2) Non-comparison binops should receive taint of both parameters.
0x8b - 0x91 f32.unop v1 T (R) = T (v1) Unops should receive taint of the parameter.
0x92 - 0x98 f32.binop v1 v2 (non-comparison) T (R) = T (v1) ∨ T (v2) Non-comparison binops should receive taint of both parameters.
0x99 - 0x9f f64.unop v1 T (R) = T (v1) Unops should receive taint of the parameter.
0xa0 - 0xa6 f64.binop v1 v2 (non-comparison) T (R) = T (v1) ∨ T (v2) Non-comparison binops should receive taint of both parameters.
TABLE I. TAINT PROPAGATION LOGIC
the third the parameters have taint 0x1, 0x2, and 0x4,
respectively. Note that in the third example, the 0x8 is thrown
away since there are more taint labels provided than there are
parameters.
The reason for overloading function signatures as a method
of inputting taint is to allow for compatibility between Tain-
tAssembly and the clean default V8 engine. Clean implemen-
tations of V8 will ignore overloaded arguments, without error.
Therefore, users of TaintAssembly are able to modify any
wasm functions in their code to inject taint, while still being
able to run the original, unchanged files in clean V8.
Finally, we made modifications to the wasm interpreter to
implement the taint semantics similar to the ones described
in other taint tracking engines. We changed the way that the
interpreter handles binary and unary operations to include taint
propagation. Specifically, as exhibited in Table 1 (where R
denotes the result of the operation), for all non-comparison
operators, we want to generate the taint of the output using
the taints of the inputs. This means that for non-comparison
binary operations, the taint of the output is the bitwise OR
of the taints of the inputs. For unary operations, the taint of
the output is simply the taint of the input. With comparison
operators, we do not propagate taint.
B. Tainting Linear Memory
WebAssembly utilizes linear memory, analogous to the
heap in C, with the operations T.load with T being one
of the four primitives. In V8, both the wasm interpreter and
compiler need to be able to write to and read from arbitrary
memory addresses in linear memory, which makes it difficult
to store the taint alongside data. For example, we have here a
simple C program could be converted into the corresponding
.wasm binary using the WebAssembly Explorer [17]:
void rudewrite(int* r, int N) {
for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) {
memcpy(r, i, sizeof(int));
r++;
}
}
(i32.load align=1
(i32.add
(get_local $2)
(i32.const 8)))
Fig. 2. Tracking taint inside the wasm linear memory (heap). Note the unique
WasmContext
This computes a memory address by adding a parameter and
a constant value, and loads a value located in linear memory
at that address. Since it offsets by sizeof(int), it would
be difficult to place taints alongside data without substantial
revision to the original code. Using a function to map memory
locations with spacing left for taint would also be difficult,
because our taint_t type defaults to 4 bytes while single
byte values are common in C.
Therefore, similarly to Panorama’s shadow heap [8], we
implemented a mapping from memory addresses to taint
values. Instead of using page tables, we implemented it using
an std::unordered_map. Whenever a memory value is
read in through T.load, the address is checked to see if it
has taint before wrapping it inside a WasmValue. Likewise,
when a T.store command is executed, the WasmValue’s
taint is unwrapped and the address and taint placed as key and
value in our map. Whenever a wasm context destroys itself, it
clears the map. This design is illustrated in Figure 2.
We originally meant to modify V8’s memory allocation
for linear memory be allocating a section of memory op-
posite of linear memory for storing taints. We decided to
use a C++ std::unordered_map, however, because V8
3
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uses a generic Handler for managing memory allocations
and offsets. Given the time constraints, we were unable to
ensure that our tainted linear memory would grow with the
regular linear memory without trampling over other V8 internal
memory structures. Therefore, our current implementation uses
a unordered_map kept for each WasmContext.
C. Probabilistic Taint Tracking
Finally, we included an option for probabilistic taint, where
taint propagates only some of the time. The propagation
semantics are as follows. Let us have values v1, v2 with
respective taints t1, t2 and probabilities of propagation p1, p2
and operation op. Let r be the result of operation op on those
values. Then, r will have taint t1 ∨ t2 with probability p1p2,
t1 with probability p1(1− p2), t2 with probability (1− p1)p2,
and 0 with probability (1 − p1)(1 − p2). In other words, the
taint from value vi is propagated with probability pi. Finally,
the propagation probability associated with this r will be
max(p1, p2).
In terms of representing the taint value and probability of
propagation, we preserve the same taint label structure as from
basic taint tracking. The difference is that we reserve some
number of higher order bits of the taint label for representing
the propagation probability, as in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The structure of a taint_t when probablistic taint propagation is
being used.
The way this encoding works is that if there are n bits
reserved for the probability and the value stored there is m,
the propagation probability being represented is p = m2n−1 .
The motivation for probabilistic taint propagation is pri-
marily that it allows us to set some sort of “lifetime” for
taint. As a taint gets passed through the data, the propagation
probability makes it possible for the taint to disappear over
time. Specifically, the smaller the propagation probability, the
shorter a taint’s lifetime is. This might desirable if you have
some value with unimportant taint, and you only wish for it
to only taint values that it acts upon most directly.
D. Additional Features
In addition to basic taint tracking, we also implemented
logging. We provide two levels of detail to our logging. In
one, we only log when a tainted value is returned from
WebAssembly to JavaScript, while in the other we log all
operations and function calls.
We also wrote functionality that would terminate execution
of a program if a tainted value is returned from WebAssembly
to JavaScript. Specifically, we provided an option for termi-
nating the program on the appearance of return values with
specific taint flags set, where the relevant flags would be user-
input. For instance, a user would input 0x15 if they would
like we could termination whenever an output with taint 0x1,
0x4, or 0x10 is returned.
The primary motivation for this feature is giving the
developer a nice and easy way of seeing when tainted values
are getting inadvertently passed to JavaScript libraries without
having to go through a taint log. In addition, although our
taint tracking engine is primarily meant for developer and
debugging use, this feature could hypothetically allow a user
to prevent their own information from being leaked out by
running our taint tracking engine.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe various tests and benchmarks
that we used to evaluate our TaintAssembly engine. We per-
formed tests involving a variety of web applications employing
WebAssembly to assess the runtime overhead resulting from
our modifications, as well as an examination of a specific
source of overhead arising from our method for introducing
taint. Finally, we do some analysis of our probabilistic taint
feature, looking at how propagation probability relates to taint
lifetime.
A. Program Runtime
The basic taint tracking features of our TaintAssembly
engine were tested on some online applications that use
WebAssembly. Since TaintAssembly is essentially a modified
version of V8’s chromium/3270 branch, all testing was
performed on a Chromium build (version 64.0.3270.2) on
Ubuntu 17.1 with the custom V8 engine. As a comparison, we
used a clean build of Chromium version 64.0.3270.2 to
benchmark against.
In our analysis, we noted down the runtime of the following
1) Compile wasm on clean V8 engine
2) Interpreted wasm on clean V8 engine
3) Interpreted wasm on TaintAssembly engine (no taint
passed in)
4) Interpreted wasm on TaintAssembly engine (taint
passed in)
The specific applications that we used for benchmarking
are described in Table 2.
The definitions that we used for runtime in each of the
applications are as follows. For the factorial, we defined
runtime to be the amount of time that it took for the wasm
factorial function to compute a particular factorial. For the
skeletal simulation, we let the runtime be the amount of
time that it took to perform the calculation for a step of the
animation. For the video editor, we chose to analyze one of its
filters, the invert filter. We set runtime here to be the time it
took to call the wasm function performing the calculations for
the transformation on each pixel in the frame. For Funky Karts,
we used the in-game clock to help us measure runtime. In
particular, we timed the amount of real time that corresponded
with three seconds in game time.
The results from our tests are presented in Tables 3 and
4. In Table 3, we present the runtimes relative to the clean
V8 engine with compiled wasm, and in Table 4, we present
them relative to the clean V8 engine with interpreted wasm.
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Program Description
Factorial [19] A basic page that advertises the new Rust-To-Wasm (TM) compiler! As everyone knows,
if something already exists, let’s rewrite it in rust! In any case, this is just a simple web
page that uses wasm to calculate the factorial function.
Skeletal Simulation [20] A WebGL simulation of spooky dancing humanoid figures that compares rendering with
WebAssembly and Javascript.
Video Editor [21] Basic video editor demo that takes in webcam input. Applies zany filters to the video and
compares the time it takes for WebAssembly and JavaScript to perform the same filters.
Funky Karts [22] A WebGL game that utilizes WebAssembly. It’s a fun side-scrolling racing game featuring
a badger driving through treacherous terrain on in a wild race to save his missing friends.
Uses cartoon type graphics that does not seem resource intensive.
TABLE II. TESTING PROGRAMS
Program Clean (compiled) Clean (interpreted) TaintAssembly (untainted) TaintAssembly (tainted)
Factorial 1.000 2.381 2.400 3.562
Skeletal Simulation 1.000 230.644 247.088 240.960
Video Editor 1.000 200.342 208.261 216.702
Funky Karts 1.000 9.695 10.835 10.839
TABLE III. BENCHMARKING RESULTS (RELATIVE TO CLEAN (COMPILED))
Program Clean (interpreted) TaintAssembly (untainted) TaintAssembly (tainted)
Factorial 1.000 1.008 1.496
Skeletal Simulation 1.000 1.071 1.045
Video Editor 1.000 1.040 1.082
Funky Karts 1.000 1.118 1.118
TABLE IV. BENCHMARKING RESULTS (RELATIVE TO CLEAN (INTERPRETED))
We notice that the factorial and Funky Karts programs have
reasonable overhead relative to compiled wasm on a clean V8
engine, while the overheads for the Skeletal Simulation and
Video Editor are substantial. However, from looking at the
runtimes relative to interpreted wasm on a clean V8, the over-
heads for TaintAssembly are all fairly reasonable. We observe
that much of the apparent slowness of TaintAssembly versus
compiled WebAssembly arises from simply using interpreted
WebAssembly, and that our taint tracking modifications do
not add large overhead (generally only around 5 − 12%) to
the engine. Therefore, it is reasonable for someone to use our
TaintAssembly engine instead of a vanilla wasm interpreter
when developing.
B. Taint Insertion Overhead
One of the primary sources of overhead is the introduction
of taint through parameter overloading, so we would like to
see exactly how much slowdown occurs. To do this, we wrote
simple C scripts that did not do any operations and simply
took in parameters. We then converted these to wasm with the
WebAssembly Explorer [17]. Then, we timed executions of
functions calls to the resultant wasm binary on both a clean,
unmodified V8 engine and our TaintAssembly engine. More
specifically, the functions that we tested each took in 100
arguments. We had one function taking in all INT32, one
taking in all FLOAT32, and one taking in all FLOAT64. Note
that we do not have any results for INT64 since 64 bit integer
types are not currently supported in JavaScript [2]. The results
are in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Overhead of passing taint parameters to functions with 100 arguments.
In an extreme case with 100 parameters, we note that
our taint tracking engine is only around 3 times slower than
the clean engine. Although there is overhead from injecting
taint into our function, the overhead is small enough for
development and debugging purposes. Most of the additional
time comes from using the function signature to pass in the
taint; it allows for minimal modifications to the source code
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when passing in taint, with the cost of some small overhead.
C. Probabilistic Taint Benchmarks
We analyze our probabilistic taint feature. As a test of
this propagation, we pass tainted data through a simple hash
function from [23], which takes a uint32_t and returns a
uint32_t. The hash function does a total of 2700 binary
operations. We implemented the hash function in C and con-
verted to wasm with the WebAssembly Explorer [17]. Using
a resolution of 8 bits for the probability and running each
possible probability k for 100000 iterations, we can see the
approximate lifetime of our taint given a specific probability.
To quantify this lifetime for a given propagation, we use the
probability that applying the hash function to tainted values
results in a tainted output. The resultant plot is exhibited in
Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Percent of return values that retain taint after passing through a simple
hash function
In general, the exact shape of this plot is determined
by the exact hash function and the number of passes used.
In this particular case, it appears to approximate a softplus
function. We see that there is a quick drop-off in taint lifetime
if the propagation probability goes below 0.6, and that we
have around a 50% chance of seeing a tainted result if the
propagation probability is around 0.8.
V. LIMITATIONS
A. Approach Limitations
Our taint propagation semantics explicitly do not assign
taint to comparison operators, as the simplest forms of such
taint transmission readily result in taint explosion. However,
this has the side effect of not propagating indirect taint. As in
Panorama [8], we could have handled this by only tainting
the program counter to propagate indirect taint in specific
functions, but we did not have a chance to implement such
a solution due to time constraints.
B. Taint Source Limitations
In our implementation, our option for probabilistic taint
takes up some of the most significant bits of our taint, and
requires random number generation. This has some potential
drawbacks:
1) Probability resolution is limited by the number of bits
2) Some taint resolution is sacrificed for taint lifetime
information
3) A rand()1 call and min calculation are required
per-op
Therefore, for some computationally heavy programs with lots
of taint sources and binary operations, it may not be feasible
to run TaintAssembly with probabilistic taint.
C. WebAssembly Linear Memory
Unfortunately, it was difficult to implement efficient taint
tracking for WebAssembly’s linear memory. Since memory
locations can be manipulated directly, for complete taint track-
ing we need to create another data structure to taint values in
linear memory [8]. The current implementation causes a slight
runtime overhead for C/C++ programs that frequently read
from and write to the heap and has a large memory overhead.
VI. CHALLENGES
Much of our time was spent looking at the V8 source
code. Since the code for the runtime was complex and linked
with most of the other source files, the builds took a long
time to compile. Furthermore, we had to trace through the
source code manually and test with the debug shell for most
of our initial testing. Tracing the program calls of the default
wasm interpreter was also difficult, because V8’s JIT caused
backtraces to fail.
We originally attempted to follow V8’s master branch,
but due to active development in master we had to rewrite
our code to target a stable branch. We ultimately ended up
choosing the V8 branch chromium/3270 and Chromium
version 64.0.3270.2 [24].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have implemented dynamic taint tracking
for interpreted WebAssembly in the V8 JavaScript Engine.
We modified the V8 wasm interpreter, allowing it to perform
basic taint tracking with function parameters and local vari-
ables, taint tracking in linear memory, and probabilistic taint
tracking. In addition, we tested our modified engine on some
web applications using wasm and our own custom scripts.
Compared to the default interpreter, our TaintAssembly engine
has a reasonable overhead of around 5 − 12% for all of the
web applications we tested. Therefore, we have exhibited a
simple WebAssembly taint tracking engine that is suitable for
development and debugging.
1V8’s default settings are not optimal as they require the user to seed their
own entropy source.
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